San Francisco Chronicle November 22, 2004
Experts Fear Nuke Genie's Out Of Bottle By James Sterngold, Chronicle Staff
Writer

Arms technology spreading beyond Iran, North Korea

The three-decade-old system for preventing the spread of nuclear arms may be
eroding irreversibly as the spread of technology for producing weapons fuel
circulates among smaller powers, experts warn, signaling that a quiet,
low-scale arms race may be taking shape.

Despite occasional positive news, there are numerous ill omens. European
diplomats appeared to score a success last week by persuading Iran to freeze
its programs for enriching uranium, the heart of nuclear bombs. But a range
of specialists said the success could prove temporary because Iran still has
the know-how to transform peaceful facilities for creating reactor fuel into
weapons plants. And the administration of President Bush charged over the
weekend that Iran was hastily enriching a large amount of uranium before the
freeze, which Iranian officials said would take effect today.

Not only do Iran and North Korea have the capability to make the fuel, the
experts warn, but so do several dozen other countries -- from Brazil, Japan
and South Korea to Turkey, Syria and Egypt.

As a result, after decades of nonproliferation policies based on the idea
that the global community could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by
controlling nuclear materials and technology, such containment strategies
may no longer be possible, these experts reluctantly agree.

The concern is that legitimate facilities, built to develop what is called
the nuclear fuel cycle, could be used to increase the concentrations of
enriched uranium or for processing plutonium to make weapons-grade fuel. Not
only is the technology for these processes widely available to countries
rich and poor, but some of the equipment needed for the job, such as
high-powered computers and precision machine tools, can now be purchased
easily, experts say.

Lack of faith

"Even if you take this out of the context of North Korea and Iran, at this
point you have a fundamental lack of faith in the system that secured us for
the past 30 years," said Jon Wolfsthal, a former U.S. nuclear inspector and
now deputy director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. "We are ending up in the exact world we
were trying to avoid for the past 30 years. Nuclear weapons are increasingly
available and valuable in international affairs, and the fuel cycle issue is
making it worse."

Added David Smith, a former arms-control negotiator under the first
President George Bush and now chief operating officer of the National
Institute for Public Policy, a conservative Washington think tank, "Maybe in
some ideal world where the sky is a different color, maybe you can stop the
spread, but in my world there are just too many competing interests, too
much technology that is already out there. What you can do is make it more
expensive, harder to do, to get the bad guys from obtaining nuclear
weapons."

In a recent interview with The Chronicle, Mohamed ElBaradei,
director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
U.N.-affiliated body that has tried to halt nuclear proliferation with its
monitoring and inspection system, called the widely distributed facilities
for developing the fuel cycle "latent bomb plants."

"We are really headed in a really dangerous path, in my view," he said.

The numbers

"The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices,"
published recently by the Brookings Institution, examines in detail how many
countries may be starting down this dangerous path. The book analyzes the
situations in Egypt, Syria, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan, looking at their incentives for turning fuel cycle or
research plants into bomb plants.

Peaceful uses of nuclear facilities include energy production, medicine and
research. But both inside and outside the U.S. government, many experts now
call ostensibly peaceful nuclear fuel facilities "virtual nuclear arsenals,"
because those same programs can quickly become the heart of a weapons
program.

"I think the sense that things are not going well is shared by a lot of
people because of these programs," said David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security, a leading Washington think
tank on nuclear weapons issues.

Albright calls himself an optimist, believing that inspections and
persuasion can still prevent wider proliferation, but, he conceded, "we've
reached a point where if we don't solve some of these problems, it becomes
overwhelming."

Some of these fuel cycle programs have been covert, and some in the open.
Iran, for instance, had violated the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty by concealing some aspects of its program to build a fuel cycle -- a
uranium enrichment facility. And some opponents of the fundamentalist regime
have claimed the government is still hiding weapons facilities, though they
have produced no evidence so far.

But most of Iran's efforts have been done legally, and the government has
said that, under the deal with the Europeans, it would only suspend, not
dismantle, its fuel cycle program. Iran says its nuclear facilities are
intended only for peaceful purposes, but the Bush administration has
generally insisted that the program has to be permanently shut down.

It is unclear how much that would matter.

Countries of concern

Currently, nine countries -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France,
China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea -- possess, or are suspected
of possessing, nuclear weapons. ElBaradei said that within a decade or so,
as many as 40 countries will have the ability to make fuel, and thus
warheads. He suggested that, no matter the outcome of the deal with the
Europeans, Iran has essentially crossed the nuclear weapons threshold.

"Iran has developed every aspect of the fuel cycle. ... I'm saying they have
the know-how," ElBaradei said.

Most of the recent efforts by the United States, the United Nations and the
major industrialized countries in halting the spread of nuclear weapons have
focused on what are regarded as the key vulnerabilities -- the large, poorly
guarded stocks of weapons-grade material in the former Soviet bloc countries
or rogue scientists from nuclear-armed countries selling their know-how on
the black market, as happened in Pakistan.

Now there is growing concern over an alternative scenario -- exploiting
fuel-cycle technology.

Nearly four decades ago, the global powers agreed to a world-wide
containment approach to prevent the proliferation of weapons technology. The
big five powers of the Cold War era, the United States, Britain, France, the
Soviet Union and China, would maintain their nuclear monopoly. In return,
other countries would be given access to what at that time was regarded as
peaceful nuclear technology, in the form of reactors and other facilities,
so long as they were opened to international monitoring.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which took force in 1970, did appear
to help prevent a rapid spread of weapons. But the seeds of today's problem
were spread widely as numerous countries obtained reactors and experimented
with the fuel cycle.

Newcomers

Experts worry now that some countries, fearful over the success of Iran and
North Korea in enriching fuel, could push their own programs, igniting an
arms race. If North Korea's bomb program is not shut down, for instance,
neighboring countries with fuel cycle technology -- Taiwan, South Korea and
Japan -- might take the next step and build warheads.

South Korea, which has large commercial and research programs, recently
admitted that it had secretly experimented with uranium enrichment, in
violation of its treaty obligations. The South Korean government said the
experiments were done by scientists without official approval, but North
Korea seized on the disclosures to argue that it needed to maintain its
programs.

"If North Korea conducts a test and breaks into the nuclear club, and if
Iran completes facilities for enriching or reprocessing, the whole set of
nonproliferation constraints will unravel quickly, maybe even explode," said
Graham Allison, a senior Defense Department official in the Clinton
administration and author of "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable
Catastrophe."

During the presidential campaign, both Bush and Sen. John Kerry said in
their first debate that the spread of nuclear weapons was the greatest
security threat facing the United States.

In a speech last February, Bush said no new countries should be permitted to
develop fuel cycle capabilities. But he has not offered any specific new
policies, other than an initiative to seize illicit shipments of equipment
or material on a case-by-case basis.

ElBaradei and some others have proposed the creation of a multilateral
consortium that would take control of all fuel enrichment facilities,
perhaps under U.N. supervision. Countries with peaceful nuclear reactors
would be guaranteed access to fuel at reasonable prices, as long as it was
properly monitored, but no new countries would be allowed to develop fuel
cycle technology.

Many experts say a greater sense of urgency is needed. Raymond Jeanloz, a UC
Berkeley physics professor who in January will become chairman of the
Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy
of Sciences, said the issue is a frequent topic among scientists
knowledgeable about weapons programs.

At the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, one of America's primary
warhead design labs, the Center for Global Security Research, a think tank
and advisory body, is devoting most of next year to an intensive series of
forums and studies of latent proliferation.

In May, the fuel cycle problem is expected to be an important topic at a
conference in New York, where the 189 signatory countries will review the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and consider whether it needs to be
updated.

Bush critics

Some critics of the Bush administration's record have insisted that the
United States needs to play a more active role in trying to halt fuel cycle
programs, in Iran and elsewhere. For instance, the administration has raised
no objections to Brazil building an active fuel cycle, which it says is for
commercial and peaceful purposes, even though that country has resisted
opening all its facilities to full inspections by ElBaradei's agency.

The United States has said that since Brazil is regarded as a friendly and
peaceful country, the program is not dangerous. But critics say the Bush
administration has to be more consistent and treat all such programs as a
threat.

"In the end, the big loser in all of this is the U.S.," since nuclear
weapons are the only devices that can defeat America's overwhelming
conventional military superiority, said Wolfsthal of the Nonproliferation
Project.

"Fifteen to 20 more countries could develop this technology in a decade," he
said. "It's disturbing, almost horrifying, but not unrealistic."

Some conservatives argue that it is already too late. The United States
needs to focus, therefore, on stamping out programs only in the hands of
perceived foes -- for example, Iran, Libya and North Korea -- and not worry
about allies and friends.

"There's no answer, no solution that's practical," said Fred Ikle, for years
a senior arms control negotiator and a well-known neoconservative. "It's
hard to get the horses back in the barn. One should work to slow it down as
much as possible. That's all you can do."

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACROSS THE GLOBE

Nine countries have acknowledged or suspected nuclear weapons programs.
Others, including some nations that have abandoned their weapons programs,
are suspected of maintaining nuclear fuel cycles - that is, the capability
to produce nuclear fuel that could be used for peaceful purposes or be
further processed for nuclear weapons. Countries with confirmed nuclear
weapons:

United States: 10,500 nuclear warheads
Russia: 20,000 warheads, half of which are deployed
China: 400 warheads
France: 450 warheads
Britain: 185 warheads
India: 65 warheads
Pakistan: 30-50 warheads. The head of its nuclear weapons program was fired
in February for secretly supplying nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya
and Iran..

Countries with unconfirmed nuclear weapons

Israel: 110-190 (projected number) warheads; has not signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferaton Treaty (NPT).
North Korea: 2-9 (projected number) warheads; announced its withdrawal from
NPT in January 2003..

Countries reported to be pursuing development of nuclear programs

Algeria, Syria: Suspected intentions to produce nuclear weapons, but no
nuclear weapons programs have been identified.
Iran: Suspected of pursuing uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons programs
since the 1970s. After disclosures by opponents of the regime, Iran admitted
to having secret centrifuge facilities for producing highly enriched
uranium, and last week agreed to freeze its enrichment program, at least
temporarily, while negotiations continue..

Countries that have disbanded nuclear weapons programs

Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan: Inherited nuclear weapons at the breakup of
the Soviet Union, but returned the weapons to Russia and signed the NPT as
nonnuclear weapons states.

Argentina: Admitted only that it conducted unsafeguarded uranium enrichment
and reprocessing.

Australia, Egypt: Ended their programs before they signed the NPT.

Brazil: Ended weapons program before 1970. Admits having a nuclear fuel
cycle, but has resisted allowing U.N. nuclear weapons inspectors broader
access to its nuclear facilities.

Iraq: Nuclear weapons program started in the early 1970s, but was
effectively halted in 1991 by Security Council-mandated inspections. In
1998, Saddam Hussein refused to allow inspections to continue and was
suspected of resuming a nuclear weapons program. But the final report by
U.S. weapons inspectors, released in October, said Iraq did not have such a
program at the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003.

Libya: Agreed in December 2003 to abandon its nuclear program, including
centrifuges and bomb designs provided by a rogue Pakistani scientist. It
disclosed its history of trying to build the nuclear fuel cycle in return
for a promise that Western countries would lift trade sanctions.

Romania: Former Warsaw Pact country once had a plutoniumseparation program.

South Africa: Abandoned its program before it signed the NPT in 1991, but
maintains stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium under
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

South Korea: Program ended after 1970. Disclosed recently that its
scientists had secretly conducted a plutonium-based experiment in 1982 and a
uranium enrichment project in 2000.

Spain: May have had an unacknowledged nuclear weapons program under the
previous military dictatorship.

Sweden: Had a program that was essentially ended by the time it signed the
NPT.

Taiwan: Ended its program after 1970.

Yugoslavia: The former communist government had a program that was ended
after 1970.

Sources: Nuclear Threat Initiative; Center for Defense Information; Monterey
Institute for International Studies; "Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2000,"
by Robert Norris and William Arkin; Institute for Science and International
Security; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2000; BBC News;
United Nations (disarmament.un.org); additional research by Chronicle
librarian Lois Jermyn